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The launch of the CLSTM 1 system on 9 September 2002 marked the completion of an ambitious project
undertaken by the banking sector following the G10 central banks’ recommendations on reducing
settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions. The CLS system is owned by 66 of the largest foreign
exchange-dealing banks, including 4 French banks. In the first phase, 7 currencies (euro, US dollar,
sterling, yen, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar and Australian dollar) will be eligible for CLS. The system
is bound to establish itself as the standard “market infrastructure” for settling foreign exchange
transactions.
The first section of this article looks at the CLS system in light of the central banks’ joint efforts with the
banking industry to reduce settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions. The second section describes
the CLS operating principles and its contribution to controlling settlement risk. The third section discusses
the central banks’ role in the oversight of the CLS project. The final section looks at the impact that the
implementation of the system may have on payment activities.
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1| Initiatives by central banks
and the banking industry to reduce settlement risk
in foreign exchange transactions
1|1 Settlement risk in foreign
exchange transactions
The following example illustrates settlement risk in
foreign exchange transactions. Two counterparties,
called Bank A and Bank B, have agreed to a foreign
exchange transaction in which Bank A sells Bank B
1 million US dollars at a rate of 1 dollar for 120 yen.
To settle the transaction, Bank A has to deliver 1 million
dollars to Bank B (dollar leg) and receive 120 million
yen from Bank B in exchange (yen leg). In symmetrical
terms, Bank B has to deliver 120 million yen and receive
1 million dollars from Bank A in exchange.
As Diagram 1 shows, the two legs of the transaction
are settled through separate circuits that are
independent of each other. This means that Bank A
incurs the risk of delivering the dollars to Bank B
without receiving the yen from Bank B and,
conversely, Bank B assumes the risk of delivering
the yen to Bank A without receiving the dollars from
Bank A in exchange.
Diagram 1
Conventional settlement circuit
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The authoritative Allsopp Report 2 defines settlement
risk in foreign exchange transactions, which is also
termed “Herstatt risk”, as the risk that “one party to
a foreign exchange transaction will pay the currency
it sold but not receive the currency it bought”. Any
bank involved in a foreign exchange transaction
incurs this risk from the time it submits an irrevocable
payment instruction for the delivery of the “sold”
currency up until the moment it knows for certain
whether it has received the “bought” currency from
the counterparty.
Thus, Bank A’s exposure to settlement risk arises when
it sends its irrevocable instruction for payment of the
dollar leg and it does not end until it receives
irrevocable payment of the funds corresponding to the
yen leg of the transaction. Similarly, Bank B is “at risk”
from the time it sends its irrevocable instruction for
the yen payment until it receives the irrevocable
payment of the dollars bought from Bank A.
The Allsopp Report contains analysis based on a survey
of 80 banks from G10 countries conducted in 1994
and 1995. The survey showed that the average
exposure to settlement risk in foreign exchange
transactions extended over several days. This defied
the common belief that the risk stemmed solely from
time zone differences and only lasted a few hours at
most, as well as the belief that the risk is incurred
only by the counterparty that has the time zone
difference working “against” it.
The time the exposure lasts is the sum of all the
processing times at every level of both settlement
circuits, including the internal processing procedures
of Bank A and Bank B, those of their respective
correspondent banks for the two currencies and the
operating rules of the interbank systems used to
transmit the payment instructions.
The total amount exposed to settlement risk for a
given bank at any time is the cumulative amount of
all of the foreign exchange transactions “at risk”, as
defined above. As mentioned above, the risk
exposure arising from a given transaction can last
for several days. The Allsopp Report showed that
some institutions’ risk exposure could at times be as
great as or even exceed their capital, and that it could
be concentrated on a single counterparty. This would
place the institution in great peril in the event of
the failure of this counterparty.
2  See “Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions” (Bank for International Settlements, March 1996, available for downloading at www.bis.org).
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The central banks’ recommendations on reducing
settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions are
warranted by this situation, along with the sheer
scale of overall trading on the global foreign exchange
market (1.2 trillion dollars per day).
1|2 Responses from central banks
and the financial sector
After the publication of the Allsopp Report, the G10
central banks strove to raise awareness in the
banking industry in general and in individual banks.
They sparked practical initiatives to reduce or
eliminate settlement risk.
Reducing settlement risk primarily requires a
reduction in the duration of exposure through better
management of procedures at every step in the
settlement process.
Banks took notice of the Allsopp Report
recommendations on this point. A progress report 3
released two years after the Allsopp Report showed
a substantial reduction in the average duration of
exposure to settlement risk.
Reducing settlement risk may also require
implementation of bilateral or multilateral netting
systems that greatly reduce the value at risk
(see Box 1).
However, an arrangement that ensures simultaneous
and linked payment of both legs of a foreign
exchange transaction is required to eliminate
settlement risk completely. Building on the delivery
versus payment (DVP) concept already applied in
securities settlement systems, the payment versus
payment (PVP) concept was developed for foreign
exchange transactions. It aims to ensure that each
counterparty pays what it owes if, and only if, it
receives what is owed to it.
Such an arrangement was the goal of the CLS project
launched by the G20  4 banks. These banks started
by setting up CLS Services Limited, followed by a
subsidiary called CLS Bank International (CLS Bank),
which was incorporated in New York as an “Edge
corporation” for the purpose of settling eligible
foreign exchange transactions across its books 5.
Despite its apparent simplicity, implementation of
the payment-versus-payment concept within the
specific context of foreign exchange transactions at
the global level raises very complex issues. It had to
be implemented in such a way that eliminating
settlement risk did not create or exacerbate other
types of risks, such as liquidity risk. This is why it
took so long for the project leading up to the launch
of the CLS system to be completed.
3 “Reducing Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk: a Progress Report”  (Bank for International Settlements, July 1998, available for downloading at
www.bis.org). This document is called the “Sweet Report” in honour of the chairman of the working group.
4 A group of commercial banks from 8 countries that was set up to consider payment-versus-payment solutions.
5 The group’s structure has changed: CLS Bank International  and CLS Services are now both subsidiaries of CLS UK Intermediate Holdings
Limited, which is a subsidiary of CLS Group Holdings AG, which has its head office in Switzerland.134 FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002
Box 1
Examples of bilateral and multilateral netting
We take a situation where the following transactions between Banks A, B and C all need to be settled for the same
value date:
° N n o i t c a s n a r Tk n a Bs y a Ps e v i e c e Ry t r a p r e t n u o C
1 AR U E2 0 1D S U0 0 1B
2 BR U E0 0 1D S U8 9C
3 AY P J0 2 0 ‚ 2 1R U E0 0 1B
4A D S U8 9R U E0 0 1C
5 AR U E0 0 1D S U8 9B
6 BY P J0 5 2 ‚ 2 1D S U0 0 1C















Under a bilateral netting system, there is at most one payment for each pair of counterparties and each








USD 198 USD 198
USD 98
EUR 100
In this example, a single euro payment between Bank A and Bank B is substituted for the payments that would
be required without netting of EUR 102 and EUR 100 from Bank A to Bank B and of EUR 100 from Bank B to
Bank A. Furthermore, Bank C can meet its dollar obligations towards Bank B by making a single payment,
instead of two. The same is true of the dollar obligations between Bank B and Bank A.
Under a multilateral netting system, each bank has to make or receive at most one payment in each currency.
The amount of the payment is equal to the net balance of all of the participant’s transactions in that











The dollar payment that Bank B is supposed to make to Bank A and the dollar payment that Bank B is
supposed to receive from Bank C under the bilateral netting arrangement are netted off: Bank B no longer has
to make or receive any dollar payments. A similar situation applies to Bank C’s payments in euro.FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002 135
2| CLS operating principles
As we have seen, the CLS system eliminates
settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions by
applying the payment-versus-payment concept. In
addition, CLS includes arrangements to limit
participants’ negative positions at all times to provide
at least partial protection against liquidity risk. It
also has failure management procedures that
attenuate the impact of defaults on the non-failing
participants.
2|1 Payment mode
Payment principles under CLS
Each participant holds a multi-currency account with
CLS Bank, with a subaccount for each currency
approved to settle through the system. The CLS Bank
provides a “payment versus payment” arrangement,
simultaneously settling both sides of a transaction
on a trade-by-trade basis across these accounts.
Transactions cannot settle unless both
counterparties have enough of the required
currencies in their accounts with CLS Bank. If this
condition is met, settlement of the transaction occurs
immediately and is then final.
The example below (Diagram 2) shows the
settlement of two transactions that both involve
Bank A. The first decreases the bank’s position on
its euro-sub account and the second increases it. In
more general terms, the effect of successive
settlements of transactions across accounts on CLS
Bank’s books on the participants’ accounts is the
creation of positions in each currency equal to their
multilateral net balances.
Each participant’s final position in each currency
has to be settled in central bank money. Any
participant with a negative position in a currency
on its account with CLS Bank has to pay in the
equivalent amount in central bank money. Likewise,
CLS Bank has to pay out an equivalent amount in
central bank money to any participant with a
positive position in a given currency on its account.
Diagram 2
Debits and credits to accounts with CLS Bank
during settlement
Transaction 1
Bank A Bank B
USD 100
EUR 102
If the transaction is accepted, the following debits
and credits are made simultaneously across CLS
Bank’s books.
Bank A’s multi-currency account:
– debit : USD 100
– credit : EUR 102
Bank B’s multi-currency account:
– debit : EUR 102
– credit : USD 100
Transaction 2
Bank A Bank C
EUR 100
GBP 63
If the transaction is accepted, the following debits
and credits are made simultaneously across CLS
Bank’s books.
Bank A’s multi-currency account:
– debit : EUR 100
– credit : GBP 63
Bank C’s multi-currency account:
– debit : GBP 63
– credit : EUR 100
2 d n a 1 s n o i t c a s n a r t f o t n e m e l t t e s e h t f o e m o c t u O
t n u o c c a y c n e r r u c - i t l u m e h t s s o r c a
A k n a BB k n a BC k n a B
R U E2 2 0 1 -0 0 1
P B G3 6– 3 6 -
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Box 2
CLS risk control measures
CLS applies three risk control measures at all times:
– A participant’s overall balance across all its currency subaccounts must always be positive or equal to zero,
– A participant’s negative position in a given currency must not exceed the limit called the "short position
limit" (SPL),
– The sum of a participant’s negative positions must not exceed the limit called the "aggregate short position
limit" (ASPL).
These various balances, aggregates and limits are expressed in dollar equivalents. For this purpose, CLS
updates the dollar rates of the currencies in real time using the average bid and offered rates of ten of the most
active traders in the market. In view of the potential variations in these rates during the settlement process, a
market volatility haircut is applied to the net positions.
Each participant is assigned a specific aggregate short position limit (ASPL) that depends on its capital and its
short-term rating. This limit is aimed at managing counterparty risk by making sure that each participant’s
overall obligations are within limits at all times. It completes the system eligibility rules, which require a
minimum rating for participants.
The short position limit (SPL) is calculated for each currency. This limit ensures that the system can provide
timely settlement even if the participant with the largest negative position in the currency concerned is unable
to make all of its pay-ins. CLS Bank has signed contracts with a number of credit institutions called "liquidity
providers" that undertake to provide the liquidity necessary to cover a shortfall up to the short position limit.
The transactions to pay off negative and positive
positions are referred to as pay-ins and pay-outs.
These payments have to be made via payment
systems that provide real-time finality for central
bank money transfers. For this reason, pay-ins and
pay-outs are made in each currency via a real-time
gross settlement (RTGS) payment system.
Pay-ins and pay-outs are recorded on the participants’
multi-currency accounts with CLS Bank. A
participant making a pay-in in a currency increases
its position in that currency on its multi-currency
account with CLS Bank by the corresponding amount
and, conversely, when CLS Bank makes a pay-out to
a participant, the latter’s position in the currency
concerned is reduced by the corresponding amount.
The distinctive feature of the CLS system is that it
combines a payment-versus-payment settlement
arrangement on a trade-by-trade basis with the
multilateral netting arrangement described in 1|1
above. CLS Bank’s role is only that of a settlement
agent that credits or debits participants’ accounts
for the settlement amounts and pay-ins and pay-outs.
CLS is never a counterparty to the transactions.
The CLS system has been designed to speed up
settlement by enabling it even when the
counterparties to a transaction have a negative
position on their accounts with CLS Bank in the
currencies being sold. However, risk management
controls are applied so that negative positions do not
exceed the limits set to ensure that transactions can
be settled even in the event of the failure of the
participant concerned. Furthermore, the ability of
CLS Bank to make pay-outs in a given currency
depends on the funds available in that currency on
its central bank account, which means it depends
on the pay-ins received. Once again, risk controls
are necessary to ensure that the cumulative amount
of pay-outs to be made by CLS Bank never exceeds
the amount of the pay-ins it receives.FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002 137
Box 3
Example of settlement under the CLS system
Our example is a simplified one involving three currencies and three banks named A, B and C. Market
volatility haircuts are ignored. Unless otherwise indicated, all amounts are expressed in dollar equivalents.
The aggregate short position limits (ASPLs) are 200 for Banks A and C and 150 for Bank B. The short position
limit (SPL) for each currency is 100.
After the first pay-ins are made, the positions on the multi-currency accounts are as follows:
R U EP B GD S Ul a t o Tn o i t i s o p e v i t a g e n e t a g e r g g A L P S A
A –0 0 70 0 10 0 8–0 0 2
B0 0 1–0 0 20 0 3–0 5 1
C 0 0 5–0 0 40 0 9–0 0 2
L P S 0 0 10 0 10 0 1 –––
The following transactions have been placed in the queue:
° N n o i t c a s n a r Tk n a Bs y u Bs l l e So t / m o r F
t n u o m a l a i t i n It n e l a v i u q e D S Ut n u o m a l a i t i n It n e l a v i u q e D S U
1 A0 0 1 D S U0 0 12 0 1 R U E0 0 1B
2 B5 0 2 R U E1 0 20 0 2 D S U0 0 2C
3 B8 1 3 R U E2 1 30 0 2 P B G2 1 3C
After settling transaction 1, the positions are changed to:
R U EP B GD S Ul a t o T n o i t i s o p e v i t a g e n e t a g e r g g AL P S A
A 0 0 1 -0 0 70 0 20 0 8 0 0 1 -0 0 2
B0 0 2– 0 0 10 0 3 –0 5 1
C 0 0 5– 0 0 40 0 9 –0 0 2
L P S 0 0 10 0 10 0 1 –––
The only negative position is on Bank A’s euro account, but it is both within Bank A’s aggregate short position
limit and within the euro short position limit. Furthermore, Bank A still shows a positive position across all
currencies. Transaction 1 does not cause the position on Bank A’s multi-currency account to exceed the limits
set by the risk controls. Therefore it can be settled.
After settling transaction 2, the positions are changed to:
R U EP B GD S Ul a t o T n o i t i s o p e v i t a g e n e t a g e r g g AL P S A
A 0 0 1 -0 0 70 0 20 0 8 0 0 1 -0 0 2
B1 0 4– 0 0 1 -1 0 3 0 0 1 -0 5 1
C 9 9 2– 0 0 69 9 8 –0 0 2
L P S 0 0 10 0 10 0 1 –––
A negative position is shown on Bank B’s dollar account, but it is both within Bank B’s aggregate short position limit
and within its dollar short position limit. Furthermore, Bank B still shows a positive position across all currencies.
Therefore, transaction 2 can be settled.
After settling transaction 3, the positions are changed to:
R U EP B GD S Ul a t o T n o i t i s o p e v i t a g e n e t a g e r g g AL P S A
A 0 0 1 -0 0 70 0 20 0 8 0 0 1 -0 0 2
B3 1 7 2 1 3 - 0 0 1 -1 0 3 2 1 4 - 0 5 1
C 3 1 -2 1 30 0 69 9 8 –0 0 2
L P S 0 0 10 0 10 0 1 –––
Bank B’s aggregate negative position now exceeds its aggregate short position limit. In addition, Bank B’s
negative position in sterling exceeds the short position limit for sterling. This means that transaction 3 does
not meet the settlement criteria and it is put back in the queue for another try at settlement later.138 FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002
Daily operations
Participants can submit settlement instructions to
CLS Bank or else rescind them by mutual agreement
before 6:30 6 on the settlement day. Participants can
also rescind instructions unilaterally before
midnight on the day before settlement day.
At 6:30, the system calculates the theoretical
multilateral net positions in each currency that
would result on the participants’ account with CLS
Bank after execution of all of the foreign exchange
transactions submitted for settlement on that day.
Participants have to make pay-ins for currencies in
which their theoretical multilateral position is
negative. For that purpose, CLS Bank sends each
participant its pay-in schedule for the day. The
pay-in deadlines are 8:00, 9:00 and 10:00 for Asian
Pacific currencies (yen and Australian dollar at
present) and 8:00, 9:00, 10:00, 11:00 and 12:00 for
the other eligible currencies.
The start of the settlement process occurs at 7:00
and, under normal circumstances, transactions are
settled and pay-outs are completed by 12:00. All
transactions must be settled across the participants’
multi-currency accounts by 9:00 and the rest of the
time is used to complete pay-ins and pay-outs.
This schedule is a compromise between:
– the need to define a strict deadline for final
payment of the sums due to each participant,
– and the concern for spreading out the pay-in
requirements throughout the processing cycle so
as to ease pressure on banks’ liquidity.
6 All times given refer to Paris time, unless otherwise indicated.
7 Settlement closes at 18:00 in the Sydney time zone (20:00 between October and March) and at 17:00 in the Tokyo time zone.
Diagram 3
CLS settlement process timeline
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The operating hours of the CLS system correspond
to the overlapping operating hours of the RTGS
systems used to make pay-ins and pay-outs. The
earlier cut-off time for Asian Pacific currencies
handled by the CLS system corresponds to the close
of markets in that area 7.
2|2 Managing failures
If a participant defaults, additional measures are
taken to limit the impact of the default on the other
participants. These measures come on top of the
three ongoing risk controls applied by CLS Bank,
which are described in the section “Payments
principles under CLS” 2|1 above. More specifically,
the purpose of these measures is to maximise the
central bank money liquidity available within the
system to ensure that pay-outs arising from the
settlement of all transactions across the books of
CLS Bank can be completed despite the liquidity
shortfall resulting from a participant’s failure to
execute its pay-ins.FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002 139
Box 4
Failure management procedures
As a general rule, CLS stops sending pay-outs to any participant that fails to meet its pay-in schedule.
Pay-outs can resume as soon as the participant in question remedies its situation. Furthermore, any participant
that misses a pay-in deadline is subject to a financial penalty.
When a participant fails to make all its scheduled pay-ins for the 8:00 deadline, CLS sends it a pay-in call
urging it to deposit a minimum sum on its account. The relatively small sum can be deposited in the currency
of the participant’s choice.
At 9:00 the CLS system rejects transactions that are not yet settled and involve a participant that has not
complied with its pay-in schedule. This changes the projected positions of the counterparties to the failed
transactions. Such counterparties could end up with a potentially larger negative projected position than
before in some currencies. They could even swing from a positive projected position to a negative projected
position. CLS then sends them a “pay-in call for settlement”, urging them to transfer central bank funds to
CLS Bank to enable immediate settlement of all of their transactions in the queue.
At the 10:00 deadline for Asian Pacific currencies and the 12:00 deadline for other currencies, CLS sends
“pay-in calls for currency close” to the surviving participants, if needed. Even though they have complied
with their pay-in schedules and met the pay-in calls for settlement, some of them may still have negative
positions in some currencies on their accounts with CLS Bank.
At the same time, transactions involving the failed participant may have already been settled, even though the
latter has not made any pay-ins, or has made only some of the pay-ins scheduled. In this case, CLS Bank does
not have enough liquidity in the currencies concerned to make the pay-outs due to the counterparties in these
transactions. On the other hand, since CLS Bank stopped the pay-outs to the failed participant, it has excess
liquidity in the corresponding currencies. Therefore, it can exchange these currencies for the ones it needs to
complete the pay-outs to the surviving participants. It swaps these currencies with the designated liquidity
providers. The latter are banks, which may or may not be CLS participants, that have contracted to provide
liquidity in eligible currencies under such circumstances.
The liquidity providers’ commitments are set at a level such that, even if the liquidity provider with the largest
commitment for a given currency fails, the other liquidity providers’ commitments are adequate to cover the
corresponding short position limit. Thus, in theory, CLS Bank will always be able to make the expected
pay-outs, even if the participant with the largest debit position fails.
The measures intended to ensure settlement of transactions could turn out to be inadequate to cover the
resulting short positions in specific currencies in the event of multiple failures, or if exchange rate variations
exceed the market volatility haircuts. In this event, CLS Bank has planned loss-allocation arrangements for
the surviving participants.140 FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002
3|1 A coordinated assessment
process
Since CLS Bank is located in the United States, the
United States Federal Reserve is the “lead overseer”
that coordinates oversight of the CLS system. It
works in conjunction with the other G10 central
banks and other central banks whose currencies are
or soon shall be eligible for CLS. This framework was
used to assess the compliance of CLS with payment
system standards. The central banks issuing the
eligible currencies for CLS (euro, US dollar, sterling,
yen, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar and Australian
dollar) were invited to rule on the inclusion of their
currencies in the system. More specifically, the
Governing Council of the European Central Bank
approved the inclusion of the euro in the CLS system
on 10 July 2002.
When it received the approval of all of the central
banks concerned and after conducting its own
investigation, the United States Federal Reserve
approved CLS offering live services to its members
on 5 September 2002.
The central banks’ assessments before the launch
were conducted as part of the cooperative oversight
arrangement for the CLS system. The process had
started more than three years previously with the
examination of the operating rules, simulations of
the impact of CLS on banks’ liquidity, monitoring of
test results and discussions with CLS representatives.
Now that the system has gone live, the oversight
process is continuing to ensure that CLS maintains
compliance with standards. Central banks will have
to look into any future changes in the operating rules
and conditions of the CLS system.
3| The role of central banks in evaluating
and implementing the CLS system
3|2 Preparing RTGS systems for
the implementation of CLS
Since the central banks run the RTGS systems used
for making pay-ins and pay-outs under CLS, in some
cases, they have had to adapt their operating hours
in order to provide a sufficient period of overlap in
the operation of the RTGS systems in the three main
financial zones (Europe, America, Asia/Pacific).
Thus, in December 1997, the United States Federal
Reserve moved the opening time of its Fedwire RTGS
system up to 0:30 (New York time). The Fedwire
system now operates 18 hours a day.
Central banks also made efforts to improve
availability of their RTGS systems and defined
contingency procedures to ensure rapid execution
of pay-ins and pay-outs in the event of disruptions.
Failure to complete pay-ins on time, regardless of
the cause, could lead to the rejection of transactions
and pay-in calls in the currency concerned and
others. The failure of a single RTGS system could
disrupt the worldwide operations of the CLS system.
Thoroughgoing analysis was conducted within the
Eurosystem in conjunction with the banking
industry to facilitate the execution of euro pay-ins
and pay-outs via the TARGET system.
Recommendations  8 were issued urging credit
institutions to prepare for their pay-ins so that they
have enough time to initiate contingency measures
in the event of problems with the system.
More specifically, a special high-priority transfer for
executing pay-ins was created in the TBF system,
which is the French component of TARGET. This
prevents participants’ pay-ins from being delayed by
other transfers already in the queue. In addition,
special contingency measures have been instituted
for CLS pay-ins and pay-outs. All of these
arrangements have been set out in a formal
agreement between the Banque de France and the
French CLS participants.
8 "Recommendations for CLS Payments in Euro," which can be viewed at the European Central Bank website (www.ecb.int).FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002 141
4| The impact of CLS on payment
and settlement activities
4|1 Impact on banks’ liquidity
CLS is likely to have a major impact on the
participants’ liquidity in view of the sweeping
changes it has brought about in foreign exchange
settlement circuits.
The multilateral netting arrangement for payment
flows under CLS is one of the most important factors
reducing liquidity requirements. It greatly reduces
the amounts of the pay-ins due from each participant
in comparison to the gross amounts of transactions
submitted 9.
The concentration of foreign exchange settlements
under CLS could be another factor affecting banks’
liquidity. The scale of the investment required to
join CLS means that the number of Settlement
Members, which are the direct participants in the
CLS system, is bound to be lower than the number
of banks that are currently dealing directly on the
foreign exchange market. As a consequence, the CLS
Bank Settlement Members offering settlement
services may end up handling transactions for a large
number of third parties, thus concentrating
substantial payment flows.
Furthermore, most Settlement Members do not have
direct access to all of the RTGS systems used for the
eligible currencies. This means they have to use
“nostro agents” for pay-ins and pay-outs in some
currencies. Some nostro agents could end up
concentrating the pay-ins for a large number of
Settlement Members in a given currency, which
could entail very substantial liquidity requirements.
However, when a nostro agent handles the
transactions in a given currency for several
Settlement Members, it is likely that some of them
will have an overall positive balance in the currency.
Thus, the nostro agent will receive pay-outs that will
ease the strain of pay-ins on its liquidity.
CLS Settlement Members also need to consider the
liquidity management constraints of meeting strict
pay-in schedules. These leave banks with less room
for manoeuvre in carrying out their transactions and
concentrates their liquidity requirements between
the hours of 7:00 and 12:00.
Overall, on the basis of simulations conducted as part
of the CLS project, Settlement Members are of the
opinion that the impact of CLS on their liquidity
requirements will be manageable. This is in line with
the liquidity profile analysis conducted on the French
Settlement Members during the first few weeks of
live operations 10. Naturally, this view will have to
be confirmed as CLS reaches full-scale operations.
Nevertheless, Settlement Members felt it would be
a good idea to introduce arrangements to reduce
liquidity constraints. They call for “inside/outside
swaps” where two Settlement Members enter into a
swap to reduce their negative positions in certain
currencies on their multi-currency accounts with
CLS Bank, thereby reducing the pay-ins
requirements. This swap involves an inside leg
settled via CLS and an outside leg settled through
other payment mechanisms 11.
This type of arrangement may very well reduce the
banks’ liquidity requirements, but it has the major
drawback of re-introducing a form of settlement risk,
since the outside leg is settled outside of CLS and
does not benefit from the safeguards inherent in a
payment versus payment mechanism. Furthermore,
CLS Bank’s liquidity simulations show that if the
Settlement Member with the largest negative
balance fails, the amounts of the rejected
transactions and of the pay-in calls would be greater
if inside/outside swaps are used.
Thus, for central banks, inside/outside swaps can
only be a temporary solution to facilitate adaptation
to the new system and they should not become
permanent liquidity management tools under CLS.
9 CLS ran simulations in 2001 on the forecasts provided by 51 future participants. These showed that the average amount of pay-ins in each currency
was between 8% and 18% of the gross amount of transactions in the same currency.
10 If CLS increased liquidity requirements for Settlement Members, it could lead to higher than normal demand for intraday credit from the Banque
de France and an increase in the number of transactions pending settlement in the TBF queue. Neither phenomenon was observed in the first weeks
after CLS went live.
11 For example, a Settlement Member that is short in euro and long in yen could find another Settlement Member in the opposite situation and make
a deal to purchase euros for yen, with settlement inside CLS, and a deal to sell euros for yen, with settlement outside CLS.142 FSR • The CLSTM system: reducing settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions • November 2002
4|2 Likely changes in payment
system flows
Before CLS, banks settled their foreign exchange
operations preferably through net settlement
systems such as Euro1 or Chips, and, to a lesser
extent, via RTGS systems. A substantial proportion
of payments were also made through correspondent
banking circuits (see Diagram 1).
Since the Settlement Members’ positions will be
settled across their CLS Bank accounts via the RTGS
systems, flows through net settlement systems are
bound to decrease as CLS reaches full scale
operation. But there could also be a decrease in the
flows through RTGS systems since the amounts
settled via RTGS systems up until now have been
gross transaction amounts, which are not the same
as the net amounts paid through CLS pay-ins and
pay-outs.
A substantial reduction is expected in transaction
numbers handled by net settlement systems and
RTGS systems alike, since CLS replaces hundreds
or even thousands of daily transaction-by-
transaction payments in the case of the most active
banks, with the sole pay-ins or pay-outs, which
means fewer than 10 daily payments per currency
and per Settlement Member.
A simulation conducted within the Eurosystem on
the basis of 2001 data, which compared foreign
exchange statistics from euro payment systems with
CLS data on the aggregate pay-in amounts forecasted
by the 51 future Settlement Members, also shows a
decrease in the number and value of payments. The
decrease will have a larger impact on the Euro 1
system than on the TARGET system. Furthermore,
the implementation of CLS is likely to have a very
moderate impact on the number and value of
payments handled by the French systems TBF and
PNS.
Caution must be applied when considering these
forecasts, since they ignore the potential payment
flows between Settlement Members and Third
Parties. A Settlement Member settling foreign
exchange transactions through CLS on behalf of a
Third Party will naturally have to transfer the
currencies involved in the transactions to and from
the Third Party in question.
In addition to changes in the size of liquidity
requirements, there could be other effects on
liquidity conditions in the various payment systems.
As CLS Bank’s pay-outs never exceed the pay-ins
received and, furthermore, since pay-outs are
only executed when a Settlement Member’s
multi-currency account balance reaches a certain
threshold, the overall central bank liquidity available
is reduced during the CLS settlement process.
The satisfactory conditions under which CLS started
live operations point to its future success as a
standard market infrastructure. However, it will take
several months to make a proper assessment of the
impact of CLS on payment system flows and liquidity
and its more general impact on market operations.